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Modeling Cultural Cognition 
Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, and James Grimmelmann† 
1. THREE DEBATES 
The “Great American Gun Debate” isn’t really one debate but two 
(Kates & Kleck, 1997). The first is empirical. Gun-control supporters 
argue that the ready availability of firearms diminishes public safety 
by facilitating violent crimes and accidental shootings; control 
opponents reply that the ready availability of guns enhances public 
safety by enabling potential crime victims to ward off violent 
predation (Duggan, 2001; Lott, 2000). The second debate is cultural. 
Control opponents (who tend to be rural, southern or western, 
Protestant, male, and white) venerate guns as symbols of personal 
honor, individual self-sufficiency, and respect for social authority. 
Control supporters (who are disproportionately urban, eastern, 
Catholic or Jewish, female, and African-American) despise firearms, 
which to them symbolize the perpetuation of illicit social hierarchies, 
the elevation of force over reason, and collective indifference to the 
well-being of strangers (Dizard, Muth, & Andrews, 1999; Slotkin, 
1998; Tonso, 1982; Hofstadter, 1970; Kleck, 1996; Kahan, 1999). 
Conducted in legislative chambers and courtrooms, on street corners 
and op-ed pages, the gun debate alternates between clashing 
positions on what guns do and what guns mean. 
Our focus is on neither of these two debates but instead on a third: 
what sorts of arguments are most likely to generate consensus about 
gun control? In a previous article, we presented evidence to show that 
cultural worldviews explain variation in individual attitudes toward 
guns and gun control (Kahan & Braman, 2003). The normative 
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upshot, we argued, was that policymakers and analysts who desire to 
resolve the gun debate should focus less on amassing and presenting 
data on the consequences of gun control and more on formulating 
gun policies rich enough in social meaning to appeal to a broad range 
of cultural outlooks. 
For this conclusion we were denounced by gun-control 
empiricists on both sides of the debate.1 Our reasoning, some asserted, 
was illogical: “[w]hy can’t both culture and consequences matter? The 
fallacy is the same as in the old question: Do you walk to school or 
carry your lunch?” (Cook & Ludwig, 2003, p. 1329).  Indeed, our 
detractors argued that policymakers and -analysts would be amply 
justified in continuing to focus primarily on the empirical side of the 
gun debate notwithstanding the admitted influence of culture. 
Presumably, our critics surmised, culture is responsive to empirical 
data: “[i]f values do not come from facts that we encounter - either 
through our own experiences, those we learn from other individuals, 
or from more evidence of a scientific nature — where would they 
come from?” (Fremling & Lott, 2003, p. 1341). But if not — if cultural 
valuations of guns are in fact stubbornly resistant to modification — 
then that’s all the more reason for policymakers and -analysts to reject 
our call to attend to social meanings and instead steer citizens’ 
attention toward the facts, where agreement is much more likely to be 
attained: “[o]ver time, a body of empirical research can disentangle 
thorny issues of causation and lead toward consensus” (Ayres & 
Donohue, 2003, p. 1256).  
We will now defend more systematically our contention that 
culture is prior to facts in resolving the gun debate. The basis for this 
position, simply put, is that culture is prior to facts in individual 
cognition. Through an overlapping set of psychological and social 
mechanisms, individuals adopt the factual beliefs that are dominant 
among persons who share their cultural orientations. Far from being 
updated in light of new evidence, beliefs so formed operate as an 
evidentiary filter, inducing individuals to dismiss any contrary 
evidence as unreliable, particularly when that evidence is proffered 
by individuals of an opposing cultural affiliation. So even accepting 
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— which we do — that individuals care about both what guns do and 
what guns mean, it’s idle to hope that “consensus” based on 
“empirical research” can settle the gun debate: individuals simply 
won’t perceive any such consensus to exist so long as cultural conflict 
over the meaning of guns persists. Indeed, if one hopes — as we do — 
that one day American gun policy will reflect the truth of the matter 
on what guns do, then it is essential, first, to create an environment in 
which individuals will be able to reconcile the truth (whatever it 
might be) with their cultural commitments. And that can only happen 
if policymakers and -analysts first formulate a set of gun control 
policies compatible with the cultural orientations of those on both 
sides of the gun debate. 
Our argument turns on a particular account of how culture and 
empirical information interact in the formation and transmission of 
belief. We will fill out the details of that account — and the extensive 
research in social psychology on which it rests — by developing a 
series of models that simulate the formation and transmission of 
belief. Section 2 will present the “Factual Enlightenment Model,” 
which shows how persuasive empirical proof can indeed generate 
societal consensus on a disputed issue. Section 3 will present the 
“Cultural Cognition Model,” which shows how various social and 
psychological mechanisms can generate beliefs that are uniform 
within and polarized across distinct cultural orientations. Section 4 
develops a model — “Truth vs. Culture” — that shows that cultural 
cognition constrains factual enlightenment when these two dynamics 
of belief-formation and -transmission are pitted against one another. 
And finally, in section, we develop a “Breakthrough Politics Model,” 
which shows how persuasive empirical proof can dispel culturally 
influenced states of false belief once policy options are invested with 
social meanings that make them compatible with diverse cultural 
orientations. 
2. FACTUAL ENLIGHTENMENT MODEL 
Implicit in the view that empirical data can resolve the gun debate 
is the familiar idea that truth inevitably defeats falsity in a fair fight 
(Popper, 1971). Truth is naturally more persuasive because it “has the 
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best of the proof, and therefore wins most of the judgments” in the 
court of public opinion (Bagehot, 1889, p. 344). Truth is favored, in 
addition, by forces of natural selection: it outperforms falsity in the 
“market of ideas” because those who form true beliefs live 
demonstrably better lives.2 And finally, truth is persistent: “it may be 
extinguished once, twice or many times, but in the course of the ages 
there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one 
of its reappearances falls on a time when from favorable 
circumstances . . . it has made such head as to withstand all 
subsequent attempts to suppress it” (Mill, 1975, p.29). 
The Factual Enlightenment Model of belief-formation and 
-transmission, as we will call it, can be seen to rest on two 
assumptions, one cognitive, the other social. The cognitive 
assumption is that individuals have the capacity to recognize truth 
and a disposition to assent to it. “[I]f you let the human mind alone,” 
wrote, “it has a preference for good argument over bad; it oftener 
takes truth than not” (Bagehot, 1889, p. 343). The social assumption is 
that normal human interactions transmit the truth and make it 
available for adoption. “Certain strong and eager minds” can be 
counted on to “embrace original opinions,” which “they [will] 
inculcate on all occasions and on every side, and gradually bring the 
cooler sort of men” to accept (Bagehot, p. 343). The idea that societal 
discourse propels the truth forward in such a manner supplies a 
recurring justification for freedom of speech3 (Schauer, 1982). 
                                                     
2  “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out” (Abrams v. United States, 1919 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
“The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error 
which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other 
truths” (Dennis v. United States, 1951 (Frankfurther, J., concurring)).  
3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.1950) (Hand, J.) (describing as “orthodoxy” of First 
Amendment the idea that “truth will be most likely to emerge, if no limitations are 
imposed upon utterances that can with any plausibility be regarded as efforts to 
present grounds for accepting or rejecting propositions whose truth the utterer 
asserts, or denies”), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); “Wrong opinions and practices 
gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to reproduce any 
effect on the mind, must be brought before it” (Mill, 1975, p. 21).   
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These assumptions, as modest as they seem, generate 
immense practical consequences. Afforded the merest enclave 
of acceptance, truth will march forward to colonize popular 
consciousness as it recruits the assent and then the advocacy 
of an ever-increasing legion of adherents. 
A simple agent-based computer simulation graphically illustrates this 
effect (Picker, 1997). For the simulation, we use a 100x100 grid to 
represent a society, whose members are represented by cells in the 
grid. At any period of time, each member of society or agent holds 
one of two beliefs — which we’ll designate as “true” and “false” — 
about the consequences of gun control. The particular belief that is 
held evolves dynamically consistent with this “learning rule”: if an 
agent held the “true” belief in the previous period, then she continues 
to hold the “true” belief in the next period; if an agent held the “false” 
belief in the previous period, then the probability that she’ll adopt the 
“true” belief in the next period equals the number of agents who held the 
true belief in the previous period divided by the total number of agents in 
the society. 
The design of the simulation corresponds to the cognitive and 
social mechanisms of the Factual Enlightenment Model. The ability of 
agents to switch from false belief to true but not vice versa reflects (in 
admittedly strong terms) the assumption that individuals have a 
capacity to recognize and assent to truth. The learning rule in the 
simulation reflects that assumption plus the assumption that normal 
processes of social interaction transmit the truth. Able to recognize 
and disposed to accept empirical proof, an agent who holds the false 
belief switches when she is exposed to truth; her likelihood of being 
exposed — through conversation, information in the media, or by 
whatever means “strong and eager minds” use to “inculcate” a new 
discovery — is a function of how many individuals already hold that 
belief (Bagehot, 1889, p. 343). 
Consider the output of a typical run of the simulation. Agents 
who hold “true” belief are colored gray, those who hold “false” belief 
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white.4 In the first period, only one agent is assigned the true belief, 
yet by the end, everyone in the society believes the truth. 
 
   
period 1 period 4 period 8 
   
period 12 period 16 period 20 
This result supplies what appears to be a ringing vindication of those 
who put their faith in the power of empirical evidence to generate 
consensus in the gun debate. 
3. CULTURAL COGNITION MODEL 
a. Overview. The proposition that social meanings determine 
individuals’ beliefs about gun control rests on what we’ll call the 
“Cultural Cognition Model.” The basic idea behind this model isn’t 
that social meanings get more weight than factual beliefs in some 
process of judgmental computation. Rather it is that factual beliefs 
about the consequences of gun control are artifacts of the positive or 
                                                     
4 In the internet versions of this and subsequent simulations, “true” is coded green 
and “false” red, respectively. 
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negative meanings assigned to them within individuals’ cultural 
groups.  
The culturally derivative status of factual beliefs is the central 
tenet of the cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). That theory relates variance in 
risk perceptions to individuals’ allegiances to competing clusters of 
values that construct opposing visions of how society should be 
organized. The individualist vision prizes individual autonomy, free 
markets, and other forms of private ordering. Those who adhere to 
this view believe that industrial commerce (which they venerate as an 
instantiation of autonomous private ordering) risks little danger for 
the environment, but that regulation of commerce risks potentially 
ruinous consequences for the economy. The egalitarian vision abhors 
social stratification and favors collective action to equalize wealth, 
status, and power. Individuals who adhere to this view see industrial 
commerce (despised as the source myriad inequalities) as posing 
large environmental risks, and regulation of such activity as posing 
little danger to economic prosperity. The hierarchical vision favors 
deference to traditional forms of social and political authority and is 
protective of the roles and status claims that they entail. Individuals 
of a hierarchical orientation blame deviance (premarital or 
homosexual sex, recreational drug use, unorthodox ideas) for various 
societal maladies (disease, crime, subversion) — a risk perception that 
is scorned by individualists and egalitarians alike (Dake, 1991; 
Jenkins-Smith & Smith, 1994; Jenkins-Smith, 2001; Peters & Slovic, 
1996). 
Using the methods associated with the cultural theory of risk, we 
have charted similar correlations between cultural orientations and 
beliefs about gun risks (Kahan & Braman, 2003). Consistent with the 
historic association of firearms with hierarchic social roles (father, 
protector, hunter) and with hierarchic social institutions (the military, 
the police), individuals of a hierarchical orientation oppose gun 
control. So do persons of an individualist orientation, in line with 
their positive feelings toward guns as instruments that enable self-
reliance (through hunting in the countryside, through personal self-
defense in the city). In contrast, individuals who hold a more 
communitarian vision of the good society support gun control — 
consistent with their view that private ownership of guns denigrates 
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social solidarity. Belief in the efficacy of gun control is also 
predominant among individuals of an egalitarian view, to whom 
guns bear noxious connotations of racism and patriarchy. 
The power of opposing cultural orientations to generate opposing 
sets of factual beliefs can be linked to a series of interconnected 
cognitive and social mechanisms5 (Douglas, 1994). One is cognitive-
dissonance avoidance (Festinger, 1957). It’s comforting to believe that 
what’s noble is also benign, and what’s base dangerous6 (Slovic, 2000; 
Akerlof & Dickens, 1982) It’s not comforting — indeed, it’s psychically 
disabling — to entertain beliefs about what’s harmless and what’s 
harmful that force one to renounce commitments and affiliations 
essential to one’s identity.7 
Affect is another mechanism that harnesses factual belief to 
cultural value. Emotions play as large a role in individuals’ 
perceptions as any of other faculty of sensation or judgment 
(Damasio, 1994; Nussbaum, 2001). Perceptions of how harmful 
activities are, in particular, are informed by the visceral reactions 
those activities trigger. And whether those reactions are positive or 
negative is determined largely by cultural values (Slovic, 2000). 
Still another mechanism is the cultural partisanship of 
interpersonal trust. When faced with conflicting claims and data — 
about the health risks of silicone breast implants, the necessity of 
suspending elements of legal due process to reduce the threat of 
domestic terrorism, the decreased incidence of violent crime in 
                                                     
5 As Mary Douglas has emphasized, the cultural theory of risk does not rest on any 
species of methodological collectivism that would assert that individuals form beliefs 
congenial to their groups because those views are congenial to their groups. Rather the 
theory describes patterns of belief that flow from the shaping and constraining effects 
of cultural on individual cognition. 
6 Slovic, for example, has shown that perceptions of risk and benefit for risky 
technologies is always inversely correlated, a finding suggesting that risk perceptions 
are influenced by cognitive dissonance. Akerlof and Dickens suggest that cognitive 
dissonance deflates demand of workers to be compensated for accepting 
occupational risks. 
7 “To the extent that information threatens self-worth, or is presented in a manner 
that threatens self-worth, people may dismiss, deny, or distort in a fashion that serves 
to sustain their personal feelings of adaptiveness and integrity” (Sherman & Cohen, 
2002, pp. 119-120). “Belongingness can affect how people process information about 
nearly all categories of stimuli in the social world” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 504). 
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jurisdictions that adopt “shall issue” laws — individuals are rarely in 
a position to investigate the facts for themselves. Instead, they must 
rely on those whom they trust to tell them which factual claims, and 
which supporting sources of evidence, to take seriously. The people 
they trust, naturally enough, tend to be the ones who share their 
worldviews — and who for that reason are likely biased toward one 
conclusion or another by virtue of forces such as cognitive-dissonance 
avoidance and affect8 (Cohen, 2003; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 
1995). 
The tendency of individuals to trust only those who share their 
orientation makes the belief-generative power of culture feed on 
itself. If a particular factual position starts out with even slightly more 
adherents than a competing one, arguments in support of that 
position will necessarily predominate in group discussions, making 
that position more likely to persuade (Sunstein, 2001). To gain the 
approval of others in the group, moreover, members who even 
weakly support what appears to be the dominant view are likely to 
express unequivocal support for it, while those who disagree will 
tend to mute their opposition in order to avoid censure. This form of 
“preference falsification” will in turn reinforce the skewed 
distribution of arguments, making it even more likely that members 
of the group will be persuaded that the dominant position is correct 
— indeed, indisputably so (Kuran, 1995; Sunstein, 2001, p. 78). 
The phenomenon of group polarization refers to the power of these 
deliberative dynamics to generate homogeneous beliefs within 
insular groups. The same dynamics necessarily generate conflicting 
states of opinion across insular groups that start out with even weakly 
opposed states of belief (Sunstein, 2001). 
 
b. Simulation. The process by which factual beliefs are formed and 
transmitted under the Cultural Cognition Model is likewise amenable 
                                                     
8 We emphasize the understandable tendency of ordinary individuals to substitute 
deference to their cultural peers for personal investigation when facts are disputed. 
But the same tendency also characterizes the decisionmaking of individuals who are 
in a position to investigate facts for themselves. Slovic (2000), for example, shows that 
cultural orientation explains variation in the attitudes of trained toxicologists on 
whether animal studies reliably generate conclusions of carcinogen risk.  
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to a simple computer simulation. Again, we use an 100x100 grid to 
represent a society of that many agents. The grid, however, is now 
subdivided into four equal parts, each of which represents a distinct 
cultural orientation. Agents again hold one of two beliefs about the 
consequences of gun control, either “true” or “false.” 
Once more, agents’ beliefs evolve. But the learning rule in this 
simulation is different from the one used in the Factual 
Enlightenment Model. If in the previous period, an agent held the 
view that was numerically predominant within her cultural-orientation 
quadrant, then she continues to hold that belief in the next period. If, 
however, she held the belief contrary to the numerically predominant 
one in her quadrant, then the probability that she’ll switch her belief 
in the next period is equal to the total number of agents who hold the 
predominant belief in her cultural-orientation quadrant divided by the total 
number of agents in that quadrant. 
The design of this simulation fits the cognitive and social 
mechanisms that construct the Cultural Cognition Model. Consistent 
with the assumption that individuals (because of cognitive-
dissonance avoidance, affect, and the cultural partisanship of trust) 
conform their beliefs to the ones associated with their cultural group, 
individuals who hold a belief consistent with the one that dominates 
in their cultural orientation stick to it, while those who hold a 
contrary belief are prone to switch. The learning rule in the 
simulation reflects that assumption plus the cultural insularity of 
belief transmission. Being disposed to conform to the cultural norm, 
individuals switch from the minority belief to the dominant belief as 
they are exposed to it, with exposure again a function of how many 
other agents of their cultural-orientation quadrant hold the dominant 
belief. The beliefs of those in other quadrants, however, have no effect 
on individuals’ beliefs; this is consistent with cultural partisanship of 
trust and also the dynamics of group polarization.  
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Consider a typical output from this simulation.  
 
   
period 1 period 4 period 8 
   
period 12 period 16 period 20 
 
In the first period, beliefs (again color-coded gray for “true” and 
white for “false”) are randomly assigned, with probability .5 for each 
belief, across all members of the entire society. Thus, at the outset, 
beliefs are almost (but not exactly) evenly divided in each quadrant. 
But eventually each quadrant is either solidly gray or solidly white. 
Because the initial distribution of views was not precisely evenly 
divided, the dominant view in each feeds on itself over successive 
periods, generating the pattern of homogeneity within and 
heterogeneity across orientations associated with group polarization. 
So here we see (not surprisingly) a striking confirmation of the claim 
that culture determines factual belief. 
4. TRUTH VS. CULTURE MODEL 
a. Overview. So far we have used two models to illustrate how 
empirically demonstrated truth and cultural values affect belief 
transmission in isolation of one another. We now develop a model 
that shows how these sources of belief interact. The “Truth vs. 
 Draft: Modeling Cultural Cognition 12 
Final version: Social Justice Research, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2005 
  
Culture Model” undergirds our contention that advances in scientific 
understanding of the consequences of gun control can’t resolve that 
debate so long as individuals’ positions on gun control display the 
relationship to their cultural orientations described by the cultural 
theory of risk. 
The basic idea behind the Truth vs. Culture Model is that the 
same psychological and social processes that induce individuals to 
form factual beliefs consistent with their cultural orientation will also 
prevent them from changing their beliefs in the face of contrary 
empirical data. Cognitive-dissonance avoidance will steel individuals 
to resist empirical data that either threatens practices they revere or 
bolsters ones they despise, particularly when accepting such data 
would force them to disagree with individuals they respect. The 
cultural judgments embedded in affect will speak more 
authoritatively than contrary data as individuals gauge what 
practices are dangerous and which not. And the culturally partisan 
foundation of trust will make them dismiss contrary data as 
unreliable if they perceive that it originates from persons who don’t 
harbor their own cultural commitments. 
This picture is borne out by additional well-established 
psychological and social mechanisms. One constraint on the 
disposition of individuals to accept empirical evidence that 
contradicts their culturally conditioned beliefs is the phenomenon of 
biased assimilation (Lord, Ross, & Leper, 1979). Unlike rational 
Bayesian information-processors, individuals don’t update their prior 
beliefs based on new evidence; instead they evaluate new evidence 
based on its conformity to their priors, dismissing as unpersuasive 
evidence that contradicts their existing beliefs. This feature of human 
decision-making is extraordinarily pervasive and robust; it affects not 
only ordinary citizens — who presumably aren’t in a position to 
evaluate complicated forms of empirical data on their own — but also 
trained social scientists who clearly are (Kohler, 1993).9 It is likely to 
                                                     
9 In Kohler’s study, scientists judged the experimental and statistical methods of a 
fictitious study of the phenomenon of ESP to be high or low in quality depending on 
whether the study purported to refute or confirm the existence of ESP, even though 
the methods were in fact independent of the conclusion. Consider in this regard the 
often-heard argument that the economists who find “more guns, less crime” 
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be especially pronounced, though, when the prior belief that is 
challenged by contrary empirical evidence (e.g., that the death penalty 
does or doesn’t deter) is strongly connected to an individual’s cultural 
identity, for then the forces of cognitive dissonance avoidance that 
explain biased assimilation are likely to be most strongly aroused .10 
A second mechanism that inhibits revision of culturally grounded 
factual belief is coherence-based reasoning (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; 
Simon, 2003). If after assessing a conflicting body of evidence a 
decision-maker finds one conclusion even slightly more persuasive 
than another, she will then re-evaluate the body of evidence in a 
biased fashion, revising upward her perception of the persuasiveness 
of evidence that supports the favored conclusion and downgrading 
the persuasiveness of evidence that refutes it. After reevaluating the 
evidence in this way, the favored conclusion will appear all the more 
correct, inducing the decisionmaker to revise her assessment of the 
supporting and conflicting evidence all the more dogmatically, and so 
forth and so on — until she terminates the process without the 
slightest doubt as to either the correct outcome or the quality of the 
evidence that supports it. This process, moreover, continues over time 
and across contexts: any initial leaning toward a particular view will 
generate a persistent evidence re-evaluation and filtering effect 
(Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001). As a result of coherence-based 
reasoning, new pieces of disconfirming evidence will not only fail to 
shake culturally grounded factual beliefs but will fail even to induce 
in individuals the discomfiting experience of lingering doubt that 
might trigger reappraisal. 
                                                                                                                             
routinely generate studies that support “conservative” policies, and the mirror image 
complaint that those who find “more guns, more crime” routinely generate studies 
that support liberal positions. Or consider the reaction to our original study of the 
influence of cultural orientations on gun-risk perceptions, which was characterized in 
a workshop as “unpublishable junk” by a protagonist in the statistical “more guns, 
more/less crime” debate but viewed as justifying a $400,000 grant after review by a 
National Science Foundation panel consisting of social scientists who accept the 
premises of the cultural and psychometric theories of risk perception.  
10 “If our study demonstrates anything, it surely demonstrates that social scientists 
can not expect rationality, enlightenment, and consensus about policy to emerge from 
their attempts to furnish ‘objective’ data about burning social issues” (Lord, Ross, & 
Leper, 1979, p. 2108). 
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Two additional mechanisms interfere with receptivity to empirical 
evidence that originates from individuals outside of one’s cultural 
group. The first is naïve realism. This phenomenon refers to the 
disposition of individuals to view the factual beliefs that predominate 
in their own cultural group as the product of “objective” assessment 
and to attribute the contrary factual beliefs of their cultural and 
ideological adversaries to the biasing influence of their worldviews. 
Under these conditions, evidence of the truth will never travel across 
the boundary line that separates a factually enlightened cultural 
group from a factually benighted one. Indeed, far from being 
admitted entry, the truth will be held up at the border precisely 
because it originates from an alien cultural destination. The second 
mechanism that constrains societal transmission of truth — reactive 
devaluation — is the tendency of individuals who belong to a group to 
dismiss the persuasiveness of evidence proffered by their adversaries 
in settings of intergroup conflict (Ross, 1995). 
These dynamics discredit the seemingly modest psychological 
and social assumptions of the Factual Enlightenment Model.11 At least 
when their factual beliefs are artifacts of their cultural orientation, 
individuals don’t harbor a disposition to recognize and assent to the 
truth; “if you let the human mind alone,” its “preference” isn’t “for 
good argument over bad” but for arguments that vindicate its 
culturally conditioned priors (Bagehot, 1889). Nor can it be assumed, 
when states of belief correspond to cultural orientation, that the truth 
will be transmitted through normal processes of societal discourse 
(even ones afforded full protection by guarantees of free speech). If 
the “strong and eager minds” who “embrace original opinions” 
reside outside the unenlightened individual’s cultural community, 
their energetic demonstrations and remonstrations will never reach 
her (Bagehot, 1889, p. 343). If they reside within it, their proselytizing 
will quickly be snuffed out by the dynamics of group polarization. 
 
b. Simulation. The insights of the Truth vs. Culture Model are also 
amenable to a relatively straightforward simulation. Again, we use a 
100x100 grid, divided into four quadrants, to represent a society 
                                                     
11 See supra pp. Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not 
found.Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined..  
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whose members adhere to one of four distinct cultural orientations. 
Again, each agent holds a belief, either “true” or “false,” on the 
consequences of gun control. 
To accommodate the interaction of cultural influences and 
empirical evidence of the truth in determining belief, the simulation 
uses an iterated coordination game. In the game, each agent interacts 
with the culturally like-minded “neighbors” who occupy the cells that 
immediately surround hers on the grid12 (Picker, 1997). In any period, 
each agent’s payoff is a function of two variables. The first is with 
how many of her neighbors she matches or coordinates beliefs. The 
second is on which belief they coordinate: payoffs for matching true 
beliefs are twice as large as payoffs for matching false ones.13 Beliefs 
evolve in this simulation, too: the belief that a player holds in any 
period is the one held by the culturally like-minded neighbor (from 
                                                     
12 The agent at the center of this swatch of cells thus interacts with the eight agents 
that surround her. 
 
So that all agents play the coordination game with eight neighbors and so that each 
of those neighbors shares her orientation, the quadrants of the grid are essentially 
wrapped onto four independent three-dimensional “toruses” (doughnut-shaped 
thingies).  
13 In other words, based on the belief it holds, each agent is playing this game with 
each of eight neighbors simultaneously: 
False True
False
True
Player 2
Player 1
2, 20, 0
0, 01, 1
 
The agent’s payoff is the sum of the returns it earns in each of these games. 
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among the cells adjoining hers) who earned the highest payoff in the 
previous period. 
This construct (in addition to being a tried-and-true one for 
assessing the transmission of social norms that variously promote or 
impede social welfare) reasonably captures the mechanisms of the 
Truth vs. Culture Model (Picker, 1997). But just as appealingly, we 
think its basic features also structure what amounts to a fair contest 
between the Factual Enlightenment Model and the Cultural Cognition 
Model.  
Because it rewards agents for coordinating with others who share 
their orientations, yet rewards them more for coordinating on true 
rather than false beliefs, the payoff function used in the simulation 
treats agents as if they value both agreeing with their cultural peers 
and knowing the truth. This is exactly the picture of individual 
attitude-formation that our empiricist critics emphasize when they 
say attack us for insisting on the priority of reforming the expressive 
idiom of gun politics.14  
What we’ve criticized our empiricist detractors for, in contrast, is 
ignoring the effect of culture in constraining individual acceptance of 
evidence that contradicts their cultural commitments. The 
mechanisms that inform this objection are reflected in the cultural 
insularity of the learning rule used in the simulation. By virtue of 
biased assimilation, motivated coherence, naïve realism, and reactive 
devaluation, individuals won’t revise beliefs that they perceive to be 
held by those with whom they are culturally aligned, or accept new 
evidence from those to whom they are culturally opposed. 
What happens when all these assumptions, mechanisms, and 
processes are rolled into a single simulation? Consider the following 
output: 
 
                                                     
14 See supra p. Error! Reference source not found.Error! Bookmark not defined..  
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Period  1 
 
period 2 
 
  
period 3 
 
period 4 
In the first period, beliefs (“true” gray, “false” white) are 
homogeneous within and heterogeneous across cultures. This is the 
pattern that one should expect to see as a result of group polarization 
in a world in which the empirical truth about guns has not yet been 
discovered. By the second period, however, truth has emerged, and 25 
agents who hold the true belief — a vanguard of “strong and eager 
minds” who’ve “embrace[d] [an] original opinion[]”— are injected 
into each of the benighted cultural-orientation quadrants. 
“[I]nculcat[ing] on all occasions and on every side,” do they 
“gradually bring the cooler sort of men” who inhabit their cultural 
world into a condition of enlightenment? (Bagehot, 1889, p. 343). 
Unfortunately not. Even though individuals who hold false beliefs do 
indeed have a “preference for good argument over bad” — they get 
twice as large a payoff in this simulation when they coordinate on true 
than they do when they coordinate on false belief — the truth doesn’t 
make enough converts quickly enough to overcome the 
countervailing disposition of individuals to conform to the belief 
that’s dominant among those who share their orientation. 
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Or at least that’s the result in this particular simulation. The 
results are sensitive to the values we’ve assigned to key variables. 
Ratchet up the difference between the coordination payoffs for true 
and false beliefs — from, say, 2x to 25x — or stipulate a “true 
believer” vanguard of 500 agents (20% of a cultural-orientation 
quadrant) rather than 25 (1%), and truth can be counted on to march 
to victory in the manner envisioned by the Factual Enlightenment 
Model. But precisely because the playing field has to be tilted that 
dramatically for truth to win, the simulation makes it easier to see the 
heroic degree of optimism that’s required to think that empirical data 
can dislodge culturally grounded states of false belief without the 
assistance of culturally sensitive political intervention. 
5. BREAKTHROUGH POLITICS MODEL 
a. Overview. The Truth vs. Culture Model showed empirical 
evidence and social meaning at war. We now describe a state of 
affairs in which the two might peacefully coexist. We’ll call it the 
Breakthrough Politics Model. 
The Model involves not just a set of mechanisms but also a 
process consisting of three steps. The first is the devising of policies 
that satisfy what we call the criterion of “expressive 
overdetermination.” A policy can be said to be expressive 
overdetermined when it is sufficiently rich in social meanings that 
individuals of otherwise opposing cultural orientations (“hierarchist” 
or “egalitarian,” “individualist” or “solidarist,” to use the types that 
figure in the cultural theory of risk) can see their way of life affirmed 
by it. Such affirmation helps to counteract the constraining pressure 
that cognitive-dissonance avoidance exerts when individuals 
contemplate revising a position or belief affiliated with their cultural 
identity. Experimental research shows that where individuals feel 
self-affirmed they are indeed more open to reconsidering their beliefs 
on culturally contested issues, including the death penalty and 
abortion (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Sherman & Cohen, 2002). 
The second step involves what we call “identity vouching.” Public 
figures who are associated with competing cultural orientations must 
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be recruited to advocate expressively overdetermined policies.15 Their 
participation exploits the culturally partisan nature of trust; positions 
that individuals might otherwise have rejected out of hand will be 
acceptable to them if sponsored who possess high esteem within their 
cultural or ideological group (Lorge, 1936). It also reinforces the self-
affirming effect of expressive-overdetermination insofar as 
individuals determine what it means to support a policy in part based 
on the identity of those who are sponsoring it (Cohen, 2003). 
The third step we call “discourse sequencing.” The adoption of 
expressively overdetermined policies by identity vouchers can be 
expected to change the common perception that the outcome of the 
gun-control debate is a measure of the social status of competing 
social groups. The dissipation of that perception in turn neutralizes 
the tendency of individuals to dismiss as biased and disingenuous 
evidence originating from persons of opposing orientations 
(Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). The effects of naïve realism 
and reactive devaluation having been neutralized, the truth will 
indeed be empowered to cross cultural boundary lines and colonize 
those who previously held false beliefs on the basis of their 
immersion in their cultural norms. Empirical data thus does play a 
critical role in policy deliberation. But it comes into play only after the 
formation of a new expressively pluralistic regime of gun politics.  
For a real-world example of these processes in action, consider the 
success of abortion reform in France. Decades’ long conflict on that 
issue was quieted when the national legislature adopted a law that 
conditioned abortion on an unreviewable certification of personal 
“emergency.” Consistent with expressive overdetermination, that 
policy made it possible for both religious traditionalists, who 
                                                     
15 This goal isn’t unrealistic. Politicians, in particular, abhor cultural polarization, 
which tends to expose them to high electoral risks, and resent the pressure of extreme 
ideological interest groups. Offered an alternative to siding with the extremes, then, 
savvy politicians ⎯ including ones who wield considerable influence among 
ordinary citizens who care about what law signifies about their cultural values ⎯ 
much prefer an in-between option. Indeed, the formation of Americans for Gun 
Safety, a group that describes itself as a “third way” alternative to the positions 
advocated by pro- and anti-control advocacy groups and which has enlisted figures 
like Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman, is an example of this dynamic in 
action in the gun debate.  (http://www.agsfoundation.com/).  
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interpreted certification as symbolizing the sanctity of life, and 
egalitarians and individualists, who interpreted unreviewability as 
affirming the autonomy of women, to see their commitments affirmed 
by the law (Glendon, 1987; Dworkin, 1994). Thereafter, the two sides 
converged on a set of policies involving counseling and enhanced 
social support for single mothers, measures that in fact reduced the 
abortion rate. The evidence that such policies would work in exactly 
this way existed before adoption of the nation’s abortion reform law. 
But it was not until after the law succeeded in achieving a measure of 
expressive convergence that the two sides trusted one another to 
believe the evidence and give this consequentialist solution a try 
(Glendon, 1987).  
The fit is less smooth, but the evolution of anti-smoking laws and 
attitudes in the United States also bears out the priority of expressive 
reform to dissemination of empirical data. Scientific evidence of the 
health dangers posed by smoking began amassing well before the 
Surgeon General’s Report of 1964 (itself merely a synthesis of existing 
literature) with little effect on behavior, much less on law (Gusfield, 
1993; Sloan, Smith, & Taylor, 2002; The Consumers Union Report on 
Licit and Illicit Drugs). Things began to change only after the moral 
resonances of smoking changed based on influences that had little to 
do with the perceived health risks of smoking (Gusfield, 1993). 
Indeed, the priority of cultural values to factual beliefs helps to 
explain continued variance in smoking among individuals,16 and in 
smoking regulations across nations, notwithstanding uniform 
exposure to the scientific data on the health risks of cigarettes (Kahan 
& Braman, 2003; Kagan & Skolnick, 1993; Kahan 2000). 
 
b. Simulation. Our final simulation is based on the Breakthrough 
Politics Model. Like the one used to illustrate Truth vs. Culture, this 
simulation reflects a coordination game, with asymmetric 
coordination payoffs for true and false belief, played by agents (in an 
100x100 society, divided into four cultural-orientation quadrants) 
with their culturally like-minded neighbors. But the learning rule — 
the algorithm used to generate evolution in beliefs — is different. In 
                                                     
16 Discussing significance of evidence that cultural orientation measures explain 
variation in smoking (Kahan & Braman, 2003). 
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the simulation used for Truth vs. Culture, agents adjusted their beliefs 
by considering only the payoffs earned by culturally like-minded 
neighbors in previous periods. In this simulation, however, individuals 
adopt the belief that generated the highest payoff in any neighboring 
cell in the previous period, even if that neighboring cell is inhabited by an 
agent of a differing cultural orientation17 (Picker, 1997). 
This simulation accurately reflects how the three-steps associated 
with Breakthrough Politics affects the various mechanisms of 
individual belief formation. This process does not homogenize culture 
or eviscerate the tendency of individuals to conform to the beliefs that 
dominate within their cultural orientation (we doubt that these effects 
could possibly be achieved, even if they were desirable). Accordingly, 
the payoff rule associated with the simulation still rewards 
individuals for coordinating only with neighbors who share their 
distinct cultural orientation. However, as a result of the formation of 
expressively overdetermined policies accompanied by identity-
vouching, individuals no longer perceive that their cultural 
commitments are under siege in the gun dispute, and thus no longer 
reflexively dismiss as unreliable information originating from outside 
their cultural group. The simulation thus allows agents to learn from 
individuals from outside of their own cultural quadrant. 
What happens? Again assume that beliefs (“true” gray, “false” 
white) in the first period are distributed consistent with the signature 
patter of group polarization — homogenous within and 
heterogeneous across cultural orientations. Again assume that the 
                                                     
17 To achieve this effect, this simulation also employs a slightly different 
architecture from the one used to illustrate the Truth vs. Culture Model (see footnote 
12). Whereas the Truth vs. Culture Model wrapped each quadrant onto a separate 
three-dimensional torus, the simulation for Breakthrough Politics maps the entire 
100x100 society onto a single three-dimensional torus. As a result, some fraction of 
the agents in each quadrant now adjoin cells located outside their cultural-orientation 
quadrant. Those cells are included in an agent’s “information  neighborhood” ⎯ the 
group of cells she inspects to determine the highest payoff in the previous period. 
However, the agent’s “payoff neighborhood” ⎯ the cells her coordination with 
which determines her payoff for holding a particular belief ⎯ exclude ones from 
outside her cultural-orientation quadrant; in other words, agents continue to play the 
coordination game only with culturally like-minded neighbors.  
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payoff for coordinating on true belief is 2X the payoff for coordinating 
on false belief. The output of the model is a happy one. 
 
   
period 1 period 5 period 10 
 
   
period 15 period 20 period 25 
 
Agents exposed to the true beliefs of agents in adjoining cultural 
orientations — who, in effect, now see those individuals living better 
as a result of their shared apprehension of the truth — adopt those 
beliefs themselves.18 They thereafter form a stable and durable 
platform for the propagation of that view within their own cultural 
                                                     
18 It is important to remember that the grid, although it appears two-dimensional, 
is in fact wrapped around a three-dimensional torus. Accordingly, agents who 
appear to be at the edges of the grid are in fact located adjacent to other quadrants. It 
is precisely because agents at the borders of each quadrant are in fact located next to 
agents in other quadrants ⎯ and thus in “information neighborhoods” that include 
them (see footnote 17) ⎯ that the march of the truth is from the borders to the center 
of the benighted orientation quadrants.  
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quadrant. Expressive pluralism has at last made the world safe for 
empiricism.  
6. CONCLUSION 
We have addressed a question of practical importance: on what 
should policymakers, activists, and commentators who want to resolve 
the American gun debate focus their attention and energy? On 
making citizens aware of empirical data on the consequences of gun 
control laws? Or on constructing expressive policies and processes 
that fit the cultural worldviews of those on both sides of the gun 
control issue? The latter, we’ve argued — not because individuals 
don’t care about what guns do but because what they believe about 
the consequences of gun control is an artifact of what they understand 
gun control laws to mean. 
Our argument is based on what we take to be the best materials 
that exist on the interplay of culture and empirical evidence in the 
formation of individual belief. Obviously, the models we’ve 
constructed are interpretive, and the computer simulations merely 
illustrative of conclusions arrived at through such interpretation. But 
we are confident that the way we’ve packaged our arguments 
furnishes a more compelling basis for belief, and for action, than does 
the collection of anecdotes and exercises in introspection that have 
until now been presented in the “culture vs. empirical data” debate.  
Evolutionary models and simulations are now used in a variety of 
disciplines, including epidemiology, economics, political science, 
sociology, and even anthropology (Galvani, 2003; Axelrod, 1984; 
Gintis, 2000; Cederman, 1997; Kollock, 1996; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). 
Their function isn’t to prove anything but to constrain proof. 
Constructing a model forces an analyst to be explicit about what her 
assumptions are ⎯ so that others can evaluate whether those 
assumptions are behaviorally realistic, and see whether they generate 
the states of affairs the analyst claims. That’s the test we’ve 
administered to ourselves with our models. 
Those who have a different idea about how the world works ⎯ 
who think that empirical evidence of what guns do can generate 
consensus despite cultural conflict over what guns mean ⎯ are 
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obliged to administer a similar test to themselves. We’re confident 
that any model they devise will show that the assumptions they are 
relying on are either behaviorally unrealistic or incapable of 
generating the process of belief-formation they are defending. 
Of course, it’s silly to think that individuals never change their 
minds on culturally contentious issues in response to new empirical 
evidence. But it’s just as absurd to believe that they ever do so at the 
expense of their cultural commitments. We accept J.S. Mill’s 
observation that truth, “even if extinguished once, twice or many 
times” is likely “in the course of the ages” to be “rediscovered” and 
finally to take hold at the point “when from favorable circumstances 
. . . it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to 
suppress it” (Mill, 1975, p. 29). But what we’ve shown is that culture is 
one of the forces that “suppress[es]” truth. “[C]ircumstances” will 
therefore become “favorable” for public enlightenment on gun 
control only after the development of an expressively pluralist idiom 
for debating guns. Those who want to resolve the gun debate should 
do everything in their power to fashion that idiom as soon as 
possible. 
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